The distinction between retail and corporate banking markets is of much importance in real life banking organizations. The two markets differ with respect to concentration, the importance of informational asymmetries, and the extent of customer mobility. Within a standard conjectural variation model we empirically characterize the strategic behaviour within each of these markets, and also focus on cross market interactions to see whether initial moves in one market affects the equilibrium in the other market. Multioutput banking firms sell their outputs in a number of different market segments, which are characterized by customers of differing informational gathering and ' See, e.g., the papers by Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) , Murray and White (1983), Clark (1984), Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) , Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall (1984), Kim (1986) , Hunter and Timme (1986 ), Mester (1987 ), Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987 and many others.
Notatet fås ved henvendelse til Norges Bank, Biblioteket, PB 1179 Sentrum, 0107 Oslo Norges Banks arbeidsnotater inneholder forskningsarbeider og utredninger som vanligvis ikke har fått sin endelige form. Hensikten er blant annet at forfatteren kan motta kommentarer fra kolleger og andre interesserte.
Synspunkter og konklusjoner står for forfatterens regning. Multioutput banking firms sell their outputs in a number of different market segments, which are characterized by customers of differing informational gathering and processing abilities and mobility across product characteristics. These differences are important reasons why banks may develop different strategic behaviour across market segments, perhaps characterised by some kind of retaliation (Porter, 1980 , 1981 and, Salop and Scheffman, 1983 or forbearance (due to fear of retaliation).3 Recent studies of such behaviour in banking markets include Spiller and Favaro (1984) , Gelfand and Spiller (1987) , Shaffer (1989 Shaffer ( , 1993 , and Berg and Kim (1994) . However, only the paper by Gelfand and Spiller includes a cross market analysis of oligopolistic competition.
Copies of this Working Paper
In this study we attempt to uncover the oligopolistic behaviour of multioutput banks which sell their outputs in two distinct markets common to all banking industries, namely retail and corporate banking markets. That distinction is new to this line of study', and its rationale is based on two main observations. First and generally, the distinction between these activities (outputs) is intrinsic to the operation of banks and is of much importance in practice. In fact, banks which are more retail oriented tend to rely more heavily on produced deposits, and thus use more extended branching networks, whereas banks which are more oriented towards corporate customers tend to rely more heavily on the purchase of funds rather than on produced deposits.' Second, these activities reflect different types of customers who differ substantially with respect to their ability to gather and process the relevant information in financial markets and therefore ' Feinberg and Sherman (1982) . ' Hunter. Timme, and Yang (1990) are the only ones, we are aware of, to have used a similar distinction between different loan market segments, albeit for a different purpose, by specifying retail and wholesale outputs in their study of cost subadditivity in large U.S. banks.
5 Also, larger banks tend to employ a higher proportion of purchased funds. their mobility across banks differs.' In addition, customers cannot substitute retail loans for corporate loans or vice versa, whereas banks can and do divert funds from one market to the other.' As a result of these differences among customers, the degree of competition will differ, and the elasticity of demand as perceived by individual banks will be different in these markets.
Since customers can not substitute, demand in the retail and corporate banking markets will be independent. Even so, any shock to either oligopolistic market segment has both a direct and an indirect effect on the profits of a bank, when costs of production across markets for a given bank are interrelated.'
After the shock the bank's initial allocation of outputs between the two markets is no longer profit maximizing, since the marginal gain from selling a unit in one of the markets has changed and the bank will reoptimize. As has been shown by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) this reoptimization or marginal change in strategy can have first-order effects on the bank's profits in oligopolistic markets.'
The cross market effect modelled by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 6 This observation is also made by Klemperer (1987) who examines markets in which consumers' costs of switching between brands of a product makes it easier for a firm to sell to customers who purchased from it in previous period (market).
' Or engage in cross subsidization practices.
8 We treat the notion of interrelated costs as jointness in production. This phenomenon may or may not result in scope economies. In our present context jointness is sufficient for the strategic interaction among multioutput oligopolies. I The reason is that small changes in bank i's equilibrium strategy in market I will cause small changes in its competitor j's marginal profit schedule and thus induce small changes in j's market 2 strategy. These small changes in j's strategy have first-order effects on i's profits.
depended primarily on interrelated costs. But they also showed that cross market effects observed in practice may depend on the nature of oligopolistic competition occurring in the two segments , and on short-run input-output constraints, such as the banks ' ability to fund desired increases in total overall lending to both markets .10 Cost complementarity, which should perhaps be expected between retail and corporate market outputs, would cet. par. induce parallel movements of bank outputs in the two market segments , as long as short-run constraints are not too severe . However , in a near competitive market segment we would not expect significant effects originating from another market, whereas in a highly non-competitive segment such effects may be significant.
The classification of banking output into retail and corporate market activities seems a natural start ing point for providing us with a more coherent picture as to the oligopolistic nature of interaction among banks. By taking account of the process by which output is supplied , the varying price elasticities of demand in each of these markets , and the possible cross markets strategic effects , we hope to gain further insights into the competitive behaviour of banking firms.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we discuss the data used. Section 4 presents estimation and results, and section 5 concludes the paper.
10 The limitation on credit lines from money market funding may be a function of the economy's openness , the tightness of regulatory regimes and the state of health of the banking system.
THE MODEL
Similar to Gelfand and Spiller (1987) , we consider a set of multioutput banks, i each supplying their output in two credit markets (retail and corporate) at prices pk (k=1,2). The ith bank chooses output quantities qk;, k=1 ,2, to maximize its profits 7r;,
s. t.
(1)
where pk(.) is the inverse demand function for product k, qk is the total supply of product k, R k j is the expected reaction of bank j in market k (to be explicitly specified below), qk1
is the quantity of product k produced by bank i and C;(.) is the multioutput cost function of the ith bank. In the case of imperfectly competitive markets, each bank will recognize that a change in one of its outputs will have an effect on both product prices through all other banks' output reactions. In general there would also have been an effect through the cross price elasticities. However, in our specific case there is no substitutability in demand between the two markets, since these markets are defined by two separate groups of customers and no arbitrage opportunities exist.
The first order conditions for each bank i are, 
where m,k =1,2, but m ;-4-k; i=1 . and ej, Ck, are partial derivatives of r;, C; with respect to qk;, respectively. The terms aqk;/aqk; are bank i's expectations of reactions from bank j in market k to its own output decision in that market. The term aq`n /aqk; is the expected reaction from bank j in the other market, m; k, to the same initiation" .
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the nature of these conjectures and to determine whether they change through time between and within the markets of retail and corporate banking. To obtain a parsimonious representation of conjectural variations, we shall assume that either the absolute aggregate response or the relative aggregate 
Upon substitution of equations (3) or (4) into the first order conditions specified in equation (2) and rearrangement, we arrive at the first order conditions for bank i in
L1 The conventional term for these expected reactions is conjectural variation . They determine the observed price-cost margins and depict the degree of competitiveness in the markets.
where k,m= 1,2 represent market indexes, and ek=-(aqk/8Pk)(Pk/qk) is the price demand elasticity in market k. Equation (5) or (6) above represents a system of two equations (one for each market) to be estimated jointly with the cost function.
DATA
The above model is applied to a panel of data from the Norwegian banking sector for the three years 1990-1992, and it contains 453 observations in total12. This panel covers the climax of an extensive banking crisis with huge loan losses, and also the start of a recovery period. Most banks were cutting costs during these three years, and systematically reconsidering their market strategies. Due to the ongoing crisis and serious bank failures, the system as a whole was very careful in extending new credit; in fact, through our sampled years, total (sample) bank credit declined by roughly 5% in real terms, which is considered as very unusual. The market interactions may thus well have changed even over this short time interval.
Bank outputs are specified as loans extended to retail and corporate customers.
Three variable factors of production are specified; labour , materials , and borrowed 1_ There were 157, 149 and 147 banks in the 1990, 1991 , and 1992 sets , respectively. This is the complete set of Norwegian banks, exclusive of seven or eight subsidiaries of foreign banks in each year and one commercial bank that was established in 1992.
money. We further specify two quasi-fixed factors, namely produced deposits and machine capital. Produced deposits are customer deposits obtained from others than financial institutions, and is exclusive of money market funding.
The bank-specific prices of labour are computed as total labour expenditures per man-hour. Borrowed money is defined as the amount borrowed from other financial institutions and from the national and international money markets. Its unit price is the money market rate, assumed equal to all banks.13 The materials input price is measured by a national price index and thus varies through time, but is constant across banks. The expenditure on materials includes the costs (exclusive of depreciation allowances) of operating machines and transport equipment, external EDP, postage, telephone and telex, and other materials.
Produced deposits are treated as a quasi-fixed factor and therefore appear as quantity (measured as average of start and end of the year balances) in the cost function.
This treatment is based on the view (Flannery, 1982) that produced deposits involve transaction specific (set-up) costs to both customers and banks, giving each a strong incentive to continue the relationship in order to amortize these costs. Thus the level of produced deposits is changeable only at increasing costs rendering its quantity quasi-fixed.
The retail output is defined as loans granted to private non-commercial institutions, personal enterprises and individuals. The corporate output is defined as loans granted to 13 Price variations due to risk differences among banks have not been important during the years covered in our sample. The estimation procedure also requires data on the market demand elasticities of the two outputs. These are assumed constant over time, and are derived from aggregate time series data 1988-91, by regressing total retail and corporate lending quantities on the average interest rates charged by banks according to a quarterly survey15 and on the "' We tried adjusting the lending volumes for non-performing loans, but that did not make a significant difference to the estimates. inflation rate. There are 16 quarterly observations, and a logarithmic functional form is imposed. The demand elasticities are estimated as -0.9017 (0.2728) in the retail market and -0.8619 (0.3256) in the corporate market. `6 Notice that these are market demand elasticities, and that the demand elasticities perceived by individual banks may differ more between the two markets, due to different degrees of market imperfections.
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

Empirical Specifications
To assess the marginal costs of different outputs, two alternative procedures are used in previous studies of oligopolistic markets. Spiller and Favaro (1984) As discussed earlier we estimate a multi-output variable cost function with produced deposits and machine capital specified as quasi-fixed factors. Thus, the variable cost function is,
VC=g( w, y, BR, Z) (7)
where VC is variable cost, w is a vector of variable input prices, y is the two-output vector, BR is the number of branches, and Z is a vector representing the quasi-fixed inputs. The empirical cost function is taken to be a second-order translog approximation to a twice differentiable arbitrary cost function:
log VC=as+E"` ajogy1 -> /3jlogw +yBlogBR+rk SklogZk klogw logwk) + T," E' A,,logylogyl+1 k B input prices, number of branches, and quasi-fixed inputs. Thus, the marginal costs of the two outputs will vary across banks and over time.
The marginal cost expressions (10) are inserted into the first order conditions (5) or (6), which together with the cost function (8) and two of the three share equations (9) form the system of equations to be estimated. We shall employ the method of maximum likelihood, using the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm.
The first order conditions were derived in the two alternative forms (5) and (6), depending on whether we choose to model absolute or relative expected responses.
However, we always find, by Akaike's Information Criterion", that the logarithmic form (6) fits the data much better than the absolute response alternative. The constant absolute response model also exhibits strong indications of misspecification, with negative
Res frequently appearing. In what follows we shall therefore only report results from the relative response specification (6).
The Cost Function
The estimates of the year specific first order terms of the cost function (8), along with the conjectural variation parameters from equations (6), are presented in table 119 The large number of second order cost function parameters are assumed equal across years and will not be presented. We have checked the concavity condition with respect to 18 Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is defined as: AIC = -2log L(f) + 2n, where L(f) is the likelihood function and n is the number of observations. 'v The measure of short-run (overall) scale economies is (1-Lbo/(La;+yB) at the sample mean (the point of approximation). Note that we include the term yB to insure that we do indeed measure returns to scale (the variation in unit costs with respect to proportional change in both network size, as measured by the number of branches, and the provision of banking services) rather than returns to network density (the variation in unit costs caused by changing banking service levels within a network of a given size). See Kim and Ben-Zion (1989) . The unweighted means (over all banks) of the returns to scale for each of the years are: 0.973. 0.976, and 0. 968 for 1990, 1991, and 1992 respectively. These estimates point to short-run increasing returns to scale, and we could statistically reject (at the 1 % significance level) constant returns at the sample mean. 2' This is a test of a2VC/ay,42<0, with subscripts indexing the retail and corporate outputs. Note that this test, performed at the point of approximation (the sample mean), is a proper test for jointness , but may not be a proper test for economies of scope because a rejection of the restricted form might imply a2VC/ay,ay 2 > 0 somewhere in the data. However, in the present context jointness is sufficient for a change in equilibrium strategy regarding the level of one output to affect the optimized level of the other output. For tests using approximation analysis see Denny and Fuss (1977) and Denny and Pinto (1978) .
22
The likelihood ratio test statistic is computed as -2log(L,/L") which is distributed as a X2 variate with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent restrictions, in this case one. L, and L" are the likelihood function values of the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively.
Behavioural Equations
The two first order conditions in the preferred logarithmic form (6) Notice that the estimated difference between the two markets originates from the much lower marginal revenues obtained from corporate lending than from retail lending, confer section 3 above. The estimated marginal costs are, however, on average higher for corporate lending than for retail lending, confer section 4.2. The mark up over costs is thus much more modest, and in some cases negative, in the corporate market. This corresponds well to the conventional views on these two market segments.
However, it does not correspond well to inferences made about market power based on concentration ratios such as the Herfindahl index. Specifically, we have computed the Herfindahl index for the retail and corporate markets in 1990-92, as summarised in table 3. The entries in that table depict a non-concentrated retail market, and a highly concentrated corporate banking market.24 On that basis one would have expected the retail market to be the more competitive. Thus, our analysis shows that concentration indices may be unreliable as a tool for measuring market power. Other influences may in practice be more important determinants.25
The oligopolistic structure identified in the retail banking market corresponds to a situation where, for reasons of forbearance (fear of retaliation), banks are not very actively competing for customers. This is consistent with our notion of retail customers as being less informed and less likely to switch from one bank to another than are corporate customers. It is also consistent with informational asymmetry on the supply side, with each bank possessing some exclusive information about its current retail customers, and thus an absolute advantage in the evaluation of their creditworthiness, confer e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) , Sharpe (1990) , Vale (1993) .
Furthermore, the more competitive structure of the corporate market is consistent with the observation that corporate customers in general have a stronger incentive to gather information and seek price offers from several banks. Since most corporate 24 Note that the numbers in table 3 may somewhat exaggerate the true concentration ratios in both markets, since non-banks do also supply retail and corporate loans. This bias may be more important in the market for corporate loans. On the other hand, retail banking and to some extent corporate banking takes place in local markets, and hence our concentration measures may tend to underestimate true concentration. These combined facts are, however, unlikely to affect the qualitative conclusion drawn.
customers must file publicly available financial statements, the informational asymmetry on the supply side might also be less important in that market.
The parameters 021 and 012 represent expected cross market responses, and are both found to be negative for all three years as shown in table 1. Banks do not expect their competitors to retaliate in another market than where the initial change in lending took place. The estimated negative response in the corporate banking market, following an increase in retail lending, may mainly reflect the rivals' expected diversion of funds from the corporate to the retail market, to generate the expected retaliation in the retail market.
Given the presence of cost complementarity (section 4.2), this aggregate cross market effect may seem unreasonable at first glance, but may be explained by the fact that the few large banks26 dominating this aggregate were during the sample years limited in their access to funding in the money market where additional funding must be obtained.27 Thus most banks had reason to expect that their rivals' retaliatory capacity would be limited.
The estimated negative response in the retail market, following an increase in corporate lending, is numerically very small. However, it combines with an expected negative or close to zero own market response in the corporate market, and may be due to perceived cost complementarity between the two outputs. We note that 012 < 021 (in absolute values), i.e. the expected response is more accomodating in the corporate 26 The three largest banks in the sample had in 1992 56% of total retail and corporate lending. market (to a change in the other market) than it is in the retail market. This is consistent with the corporate market being the more competitive.
The preceding analysis can be enhanced by paying attention to the change in the parameter estimates through time. Thus, we performed tests of conjectural variation parameters equality through the three years of our sample, using likelihood ratio tests.
These tests, along with the restricted model resulting from them, are presented in tables 4
and 5. We could not reject equality of the own retail market responses through the three The customers in the corporate market have a much stronger incentive and ability to search for the best offer among a number of banks. The informational advantages of each bank towards its current customers may also be less important in this market, and the banks are seen to possess less market power. The mobility of customers within the corporate market is potentially much more important than in the retail market, and entry is thus less costly in this market segment.
Cross market effects are found both from the retail to the corporate market and vice versa. In particular, while the direct response to an initial increase in retail lending is expected to be retaliatory, the indirect response in the corporate market is expected to be non-retaliatory. And while a weak or accommodative direct response is expected to an initial increase in corporate lending, the indirect response in the retail market is always expected to be non-retaliatory. Our findings of significantly negative cross market effects, combined with a positive own market effect in the retail market, indicate that although jointness in costs is present in our data, it may not be the main influence behind bank strategic behaviour. The negative cross market effects may instead be explained by the near competitive nature of the corporate market, and the restrictions on money market funding which may have applied to a relatively small number of large banks.
The experiences from the European banking markets of the past decade indicate that new entrants will most often try to establish some initial presence in the corporate banking market, and may frequently choose to ignore the retail market altogether. This is what we would expect from the estimated own market effects above, where we find that retaliation is expected in the retail market, but not in the corporate market. The priority given of incumbent banks to defending market shares in retail banking is also emphasized by the stronger negative cross market effect in the corporate market. This may mean that incumbent banks perceive their competitive viability as being mainly dependent on their ability to maintain their retail customer relationships. For the sake of brevity the second order terms of the cost function are not shown here. Full details can be made available upon request.
O indicates the expected response in market i to an initial change in market j. Subscript 1 represents the retail and subscript 2 the corporate banking markets respectively. (Salop, 1987) . 
